“An immediate transition to the phase of institutional activation and practical implementation of joint defense obligations, alongside taking the necessary measures to provide the agreed-upon military forces and capabilities and rapidly deploy them to Saudi Arabia”—this was the outcome of the meeting of the “Political and Defense Strategy Committee” for the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, held in Riyadh on October 5, 2026.
This move falls within the framework of the agreement signed on August 7, 2026, among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The final statement issued at the time noted, among other points, that “the agreement aims to strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression and stipulates that an armed attack on any of the three states constitutes an attack on all of them.”
Before discussing the implications of this significant step, it is essential to emphasize that the agreement represents a qualitative shift in the Arabian Gulf security architecture for four reasons.
First, this “alliance”—as it has been characterized in political and media circles—is led by a pivotal Gulf state, thereby reinforcing the region’s security needs through local leadership.
Second, although the alliance’s membership is limited to just three nations, it could serve as the nucleus of a “new regional NATO,” modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is particularly relevant given that the core principle of the Makkah alliance mirrors Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which stipulates that an attack on any member state is considered an attack on the alliance as a whole, necessitating a collective response. Third: Putting into practice the principle that “the security of the Arabian Gulf is a matter of concern to many nations worldwide.” It is noteworthy that the alliance members are not Western nations; rather, they possess economic interests—such as those of Pakistan and Turkey in the Arabian Gulf region—or strategic interests in the Gulf’s regional extensions, such as the Horn of Africa (in Turkey’s case).
Fourth: An assessment of historical alliance mechanisms—most notably NATO, founded on the concept of shared interests, and the Warsaw Pact, founded on ideology—reveals that the Mecca Alliance combines both elements: its three member states are Islamic and are united by common interests.
Implications of the Institutional Activation of the Mecca Alliance
Regarding the implications of the Mecca Alliance’s institutional activation, I identify five key points:
First: A message of practical deterrence. In its simplest terms, deterrence is defined as conveying a message to adversaries that any hostile action they undertake will result in losses far outweighing any anticipated gains. From the outset, the alliance members emphasized that the pact is neither offensive nor directed against any specific party in the region; rather, it is purely defensive in nature, established by states whose wills aligned to create it—based on the premise that challenges elicit responses. Matters of defense are a sovereign right for any state to exercise whenever it deems appropriate.
Second: The binding nature of the alliance. Unlike certain other alliances witnessed in the region—such as those formed for a specific, time-bound purpose (e.g., the 1991 international coalition to liberate Kuwait) or those with voluntary membership (e.g., the 2023 “Prosperity Guardian” coalition to protect Red Sea maritime navigation), both of which were led by the United States—the Mecca Alliance is mandatory in nature. It has resulted in the deployment of forces from member states onto Saudi territory, thereby bolstering the Kingdom’s security and military capabilities to counter any aggression against its lands.
Third: Institutionalization and sustainability. The Mecca Alliance has adopted an institutional structure, evidenced by the establishment of a permanent headquarters in Riyadh and the appointment of its first Secretary-General. This reflects the member states’ commitment to systematically institutionalizing and sustaining military coordination—whether during crises or through the development of military cooperation that leverages the respective comparative advantages of each nation.
Fourth: The intersection of regional and global security. An analysis of official Gulf statements regarding responsibility for Gulf security over the past decades reveals a common theme: all nations of the world share a strategic interest in the security and stability of the Gulf region. This has been underscored by the repercussions of the 2026 war, which highlighted new dimensions of security and global impacts, thereby necessitating the practical application of the concept that the boundaries separating regional security from global security have effectively vanished.
Fifth: Addressing imbalances in the regional balance of power. The true dilemma facing Arabian Gulf security lies in the regional power imbalance resulting from protracted conflicts. These conflicts allowed certain regional actors to capitalize on a new balance of power—and even establish networks of armed militias—thereby necessitating alliances comprising partners with diverse expertise and military capabilities to collectively confront these risks.
Alliances and the Future of Gulf Security
While the Gulf region has witnessed the highest number of alliances in the Arab world—whether to protect maritime navigation or to repel aggression—addressing emerging security threats requires such alliances. These threats include the proliferation of armed militias utilizing military technology, risks to international maritime corridors, and attempts by certain regional actors to craft a new security equation defined by “asymmetric warfare.”
I anticipate that these alliances will not dissolve once their immediate missions conclude; rather, they will lay the groundwork for long-term strategic cooperation among nations that share significant commonalities and strategic interests. This is particularly relevant in a world where the concept of security has undergone a fundamental shift, making it increasingly difficult to disentangle Gulf, regional, and global security concerns—a reality clearly illustrated by the threats to maritime navigation in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Coalition’s Leadership
Last but not least, while there are signs of optimism regarding the success of such a coalition—in terms of its objectives, substance, and timing—the greatest source of optimism lies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s leadership of the alliance. This establishes a new trajectory for Arabian Gulf security that integrates a Gulf vision with external dimensions.

Ultimately, this could contribute to establishing a new equation for security in the Arabian Gulf—one with effects that would not be merely temporary but would extend for decades to come, should the alliance expand to include other parties, whether from within the region or beyond.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk, Director of International and Strategic Studies Program