“If they don’t reach an agreement, there will be bombing like they’ve never seen before” — a striking statement made by U.S. President Donald Trump to an American television channel, emphasizing that the alternative to failing to reach a new nuclear deal with Iran would be an unprecedented military strike against its nuclear facilities.

In response, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated: “Any American or Israeli attack will be met with a harsh retaliatory strike.” In reality, this is not the first time we witness sharp rhetoric between U.S. and Iranian officials. However, what is new this time are two significant developments:

First, alongside the American hardline stance toward Iran, there was an announcement of the deployment of an American aircraft carrier to the region, adding to one already present, as well as the presence of six B-2 bombers capable of carrying 30,000-pound bombs designed to strike deeply buried targets. This is in addition to the conventional U.S. military presence in the region, including military bases and a total of 43,000 American troops in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, including reserves.

On the Iranian side, Iran possesses advanced long-range missiles and highly developed drones.

Second, regional developments — namely the events in Gaza, developments in Syria, and the targeting of Hezbollah and the Houthis — have affected Iran’s regional influence. Some view this as a golden opportunity for the U.S. to pressure Iran into negotiating a new nuclear agreement.

I am not here to conduct a military comparison, which should not rely purely on numbers, but rather on the nature of warfare itself and Iran’s likely response if its nuclear facilities are attacked — a response that would likely be far from conventional. We are still within the phase of “crisis brinkmanship,” where each side is testing the other’s limits. This has not yet escalated into more advanced phases of entrapment, brinkmanship, or uncontrollable escalation.

From a realistic standpoint, should nuclear negotiations resume, they will do so under circumstances of immense pressure. Iran will likely not be able to follow its usual strategy of “buying time” due to the ongoing military buildup. Moreover, the European role has become increasingly ineffective, with noticeable tensions in U.S.-European relations. True, Iran’s partnerships with China and Russia are important, and a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson has urged the U.S. to “return to the negotiation table and show goodwill,” noting that “sanctions and military threats will not lead to a solution.”

Russia’s strategic security official at the Foreign Ministry stated: “Russia is against coercive solutions, aggression, and strikes,” and that “attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure could be catastrophic for the entire region.” Yet, there remains the question of how much military support Russia would provide if Iran’s nuclear facilities were attacked. Realistically, given Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine war and its strategic interests, it is unlikely to go to war for Iran. The same applies to China, which maintains a delicate balance in its international relations.

Back to the core question: What would a strike — if it happens — entail, and what would be its regional repercussions? This is primarily a question for military experts. But in general, does U.S. intelligence know exactly where Iran’s nuclear sites are located? Prior to the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, voices within the U.S. administration called for a military strike. Obama then requested a report on the locations of the nuclear sites. The result was a list of 16 potential sites — highlighting that a military strike, without precise intelligence, would not effectively eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Furthermore, any aircraft conducting such a strike may require airspace access through Iraq or Turkey. Additionally, Gulf states have repeatedly opposed military action against Iran — even condemning the Israeli strike on Iran in October 2024 during the Gaza conflict.

Another critical question: Is the aim to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program or merely delay it? Iran’s nuclear program is not limited to facilities — it includes scientists, enriched uranium, and laboratories. What guarantees exist that a strike would eliminate all components of the program? It is unrealistic to think Iran hasn’t taken precautions, especially after the fall of Iraq in 2003. Experts believe Iran has equipped its sites with long-range, self-launching missiles in case of an attack.

Iran’s vast geography also offers it considerable maneuvering space — unlike its adversaries.

There remains the question of Iran’s response. Historically, Iran retains its forces until the last moment. It is expected that Iran could target U.S. military bases in the region, which, according to a Revolutionary Guard official, include 10 bases and 50,000 troops. Iran may also escalate maritime threats, whether in the Strait of Hormuz through the Revolutionary Guard or in the Bab al-Mandab via the Houthis. While Iran has never closed the Strait of Hormuz — even during the height of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s — to avoid global opposition, there are other possible measures.

Moreover, Iran’s support for armed groups in the region, particularly the Houthis, is significant in this conflict context.

There’s no doubt that the vital interests of the Gulf states would be under threat, especially water desalination plants and other critical infrastructure, necessitating precautionary measures and good-faith efforts to de-escalate.

Despite the fiery rhetoric exchanged between the U.S. and Iran, there remain opportunities for mediation, as both sides still show willingness to reach a new nuclear agreement. However, the real dilemma lies not in the agreement itself, but in the mechanisms of international inspection of nuclear programs, and in the broader regional issues that need resolution — far from military confrontations and alliances in a region already fraught with unprecedented security challenges.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej

Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow