On February 12, 2025, media outlets reported that both Russia and Sudan announced an agreement on the “establishment of a Russian naval base in the city of Port Sudan.”

Before delving into the nature, objectives, implications, and significance of this base for regional security in the area—and its connection to the broader international rivalry—it is worth highlighting three key observations:

1. Strategic decisions are not spontaneous but rather the implementation of established strategies. In July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new Russian naval doctrine, comprising 55 pages. A key recommendation within this document emphasized the necessity of securing logistical-technical support points in the Red Sea and highlighted the Eastern Mediterranean as vital to Russian national security.
2. Although a prior agreement was made in 2017 between Russia and Sudan to establish a naval logistics center, the timing of the new agreement, which now refers to a full-fledged naval base, coincides with discussions about potentially ending Russia’s naval presence in Syria. This timing underscores Russia’s strategic emphasis on naval influence in its rivalry with the United States and NATO.
3. The geographic significance: The Horn of Africa region, which includes Sudan within a broad security framework, is already home to 19 military bases operated by 16 countries. Thus, Russia’s presence in this strategic zone carries major significance within this dense matrix of regional and international military deployments.

Although not all agreement details were disclosed—as evidenced by the joint press conference of both foreign ministers— the Sudanese foreign minister merely noted, “We have agreed on all the details,” while his Russian counterpart made no direct statement. The general messaging referred to aiding Sudan’s stabilization. Publicly, the agreement represents a strategic partnership allowing Russian warships greater freedom of movement in the Red Sea and the deployment of around 300 personnel and four nuclear-powered warships at the base. In return, Russia will supply the Sudanese military with arms and equipment to support its development. The agreement will remain valid for 25 years.

Beyond the timing and content of the deal, its strategic reading is crucial.

Sudanese officials have, in recent years, stated that such military collaboration is part of a broader bilateral relationship. This includes Russian support for Sudan’s armed forces. On a wider regional scale, three major implications emerge:

1. This marks the first time Russia will establish a naval base in Africa. Africa has long been a contested space between Russia and NATO countries. NATO has frequently expressed concern over growing Russian influence in North Africa, which prompted the alliance to issue a strategic outlook in 2024 regarding its future relations with the Global South. Russia is now extending its reach toward the heart of the continent in one of the most vital regions for regional and global security: the Red Sea.
2. The strategic proximity to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—a critical global trade route—underscores the potential for Russia to protect its commercial vessels. However, this move also adds Russia to a growing list of countries with military presence in the area, including the U.S., China, and now India, which has also deployed naval assets there. This intensifies the militarization of the Red Sea and raises the risk of unintended clashes between naval forces, despite official claims that the base is purely defensive and not directed at any specific party.
3. Russia is positioning itself as a strategic ally to regional powers, particularly in Africa. It may seek similar military agreements with other African nations, especially as NATO influence wanes—evident in the 2016 withdrawal of the NATO mission “Ocean Shield” (originally deployed in 2008 to combat piracy off Somalia and the Horn of Africa), which was redirected to the Black Sea due to shifting alliance priorities.

Strategically, the base is also likely to be part of broader global rivalries, including with the European Union.

Ukraine is no longer the only point of contention in the Europe–Russia confrontation—Europe will not be part of U.S.–Russia negotiations over Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia’s challenge to Europe near maritime chokepoints becomes more visible, especially considering the symbolic role of the EU’s naval mission in the Red Sea.

Several European countries have refrained from joining the U.S.-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” a multinational force formed to safeguard maritime navigation in the Red Sea. Additionally, Iran’s growing military ties with both Russia and Sudan—including extensive cooperation—present a further challenge to Western powers. It is worth noting that Russia has not designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization, unlike former U.S. President Donald Trump.

It may be premature to fully assess the regional landscape, but two key points deserve attention:

1. Regional countries are increasingly investing in naval capabilities in the Red Sea. For example, Egypt’s Berenice military base, which includes both naval and air facilities, was established to secure its southern coastline.
2. Despite the U.S.-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian” being in place for over a year, it has failed to halt Houthi attacks. This raises questions about alternative mechanisms to ensure maritime security—such as a Code of Conduct—which could allow for broader international participation, including Russia, as is practiced in other global regions.

Ultimately, the size and operational scope of the Russian naval base in Sudan, as well as the trajectory of Russia’s relations with other African states in this strategic region, will determine the nature of global competition near maritime chokepoints. This competition is intensifying and will likely shape future global alignments amid ongoing regional and international conflicts that are opening space for emerging global actors.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.