The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s annual summit: Political dialogue and economic cooperation without a security bloc

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From August 31 to September 1, 2026, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) held its annual summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. While the summit is held annually in the country holding the SCO chairmanship according to a rotating system, this year’s summit took place amidst highly significant regional and global developments, both in terms of the regional security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and on the global stage.

To begin, it should be emphasized that this organization was founded in 2001 with six member states, and its membership has since grown to ten: China, India, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Several other countries also participate as dialogue partners, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with the exception of Oman. It is worth noting that the 2025 Tianjin Summit approved the creation of a new status, “Shanghai SCO Partner,” replacing the “Dialogue Partner” status. The current status will remain in place until the relevant legal amendments come into effect. The decision to grant the Kingdom of Bahrain dialogue partner status was made in 2022, and the memorandum of understanding formally granting this status was signed in 2023.

A closer look at the organization’s founding charter reveals that it is not a bloc directed against any other bloc. Rather, it aims to strengthen relations and good neighborliness among its members and to develop political, economic, security, and other forms of cooperation. Maintaining regional peace, security, and stability, and contributing to the establishment of a more just international political and economic order. In terms of its international significance, this organization represents 40% of the world’s population and approximately a quarter of global GDP.

While acknowledging that this organization is not an alliance in the military sense—as its founding charter does not reflect this—it has often been referred to as the “Asian NATO” in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which comprises North America and European countries. This organization includes countries that adopt positions, to varying degrees, critical of certain American and Western policies. Furthermore, a number of its members seek to promote a more multilateral international system with a greater distribution of power, while others strive to reduce their dependence on Western-led economic and financial institutions and arrangements.

Regional and global developments cast a shadow over the speeches of the heads of state participating in the summit. Among them was Russian President Vladimir Putin, who called for solidarity in the face of “Western pressure” and spoke of the need to reform the United Nations, enhance its effectiveness, and expand the representation of countries in the Global South and East, while emphasizing its continued central role in the international system. Chinese leader Xi Jinping also affirmed his country’s readiness to contribute to efforts aimed at resolving conflicts in hotspots, including those in Europe and the Middle East.

Given the importance of these points, two crucial questions arise: First, does this organization, given its membership of major powers, have the capacity to influence the global order towards multipolarity? Second, does the summit’s final statement reflect what could be described as a “roadmap for the organization’s future”?

To answer the first question, twenty-five years after its founding, and despite the significant economic and political influence of some of its members, particularly in the context of competition with the United States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has remained, in essence, a multilateral framework for dialogue, coordination of positions, and cooperation in economic, security, and political spheres, without transforming into a security or military alliance. It continues to grapple with three major challenges.

First, competition exists among some of its member states, both economically and geostrategically, meaning there is no framework within which their objectives align. Second, border disputes persist among its members, some recurring periodically, and the organization lacks a binding institutional mechanism for arbitration or final settlement of such conflicts. Third, the divergence of political, economic, and strategic interests and priorities among the member states limits the possibility of achieving a high degree of consistency in their positions on various issues, thus impacting their ability to adopt binding collective stances.

As for the answer to the second question, the final statement notably reiterated the rejection of “unilateral international hegemony” and emphasized the importance of strengthening the role of the United Nations in matters of international peace and security. It also highlighted the adoption of 28 documents, including the Bishkek Declaration and the Protocol to Amend and Addendum to the SCO Charter, along with several other documents and statements related to cooperation in various fields. While these decisions are significant, they do not represent a qualitative shift in the nature of the organization towards the creation of a binding security or military bloc, although they do reflect a continued development of its institutional structure and mechanisms for security and economic cooperation.

This does not imply that the organization is unimportant. On the contrary, it has witnessed and will continue to witness cooperation in various fields of common importance to its member states. Furthermore, it presents an opportunity for countries that are dialogue partners and new partnership frameworks to offer perspectives on current challenges. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in his address that “the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation not only plays a role in ensuring peace and stability, but will also play a role in establishing secure transport corridors and guaranteeing energy supplies.”

In my estimation, and despite the importance of the foregoing, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will remain a regional collective framework for coordinating positions on economic issues, and to a lesser extent political ones, and for developing security cooperation, but without transforming into an alliance in the foreseeable future. The transition from an organization for cooperation and coordination to a security or military alliance requires, at a minimum, clear and institutional commitments to collective security or defense, a high degree of consensus on the sources of threats and security challenges, and practical mechanisms for implementing those commitments. This level of collective commitment is not yet present in the SCO, nor is there an agreed-upon leadership among its members.

The bottom line is that divergent interests, competition, and the priority given to bilateral relations will remain among the most prominent features of the SCO’s work, at least in the next few years, as it continues to strive to develop institutional, economic, and security cooperation without transitioning into a security or military alliance.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk, Director of International and Strategic Studies Program

Last Update: September 3, 2026