There are numerous historical, political, and social factors that have influenced the course of Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi relations, including geographical proximity and its implications, security concerns and their extensions, as well as the nature of regional alliances and their impact on decision-making centers in Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad. Turkey, whose strategy toward both Syria and Iraq is examined in this paper, continues to bear significant losses and consequences resulting from regional crises and developments in both countries. Perhaps the greatest cost borne by Ankara has been the diversion of the gains achieved through its policies in Syria and Iraq to the benefit of other actors, while paving the way for regional and international powers such as Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States to exploit these circumstances and achieve political, military, and economic influence at the expense of the three states.
The paper addresses three main issues: the factors shaping Turkey’s regional vision and its determinants in general; the Turkish perception of the crises in Syria and Iraq, including the substance of this vision and the factors influencing it; and finally the mutual interaction between Turkey and the broader regional security system.
The study argues that many observers of developments within the triangle of Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi relations believe that Turkey has lost, over the past decade, many of its political, economic, and strategic investment opportunities in Syria and Iraq. This has been attributed partly to the inability to define clear positions and choices regarding the internal affairs of both countries, and partly to the confused and ambiguous system of regional alliances surrounding regional developments. As a result, Turkey gradually shifted its Syrian and Iraqi policies from a soft-power model toward a harder approach, while slogans of openness to all parties and regional stability rapidly declined.
