August 2, 2025 marked the 35th anniversary of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The details of that invasion may be familiar to many, as they have been recounted in numerous Arab and Western books and academic publications, but the strategic aspects of that war need to be further illuminated. Without delving into the reasons for the invasion, there is no doubt that the ongoing regional security crises have a direct impact on the security of the Arabian Gulf. Prior to the invasion, Iraq had emerged from the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted for nearly eight years and ended “without a winner or loser,” meaning that it had a force estimated by some sources at between 57 and 60 military divisions, with more than one million soldiers, 6,200 tanks, 550 fighter jets, and 60 naval vessels.

There is no doubt that the explosion of power meant that it was on the verge of expansion, and then came the invasion, in addition to the element of surprise, as the diplomatic atmosphere prior to the invasion confirmed, without a shadow of a doubt, that the crisis was on the verge of being resolved. However, the invasion came as a surprise to many, as there were no expectations that it would happen, and it had two implications: First, it contradicted the Arab Gulf states’ conviction that threats to the security of the Arab Gulf came from outside the region and were not part of regional security. Second, it highlighted the Arab Gulf states’ need for an alternative security option. It is true that the Peninsula Shield Force, established in 1982, represented that alternative, but the invasion highlighted the need to develop those forces, which is what has happened over the past decades.

During that crisis, the UN Security Council met continuously for six months, issuing twelve resolutions, all under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes military action to enforce UN resolutions. Perhaps the important thing to emphasize in the context of that crisis—which the author of this article witnessed as a second-year student at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University—is the keenness of the Arab Gulf states and Arab countries to resolve that crisis through Arab channels, within the framework of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. There were meetings and initiatives aimed at ending the occupation and withdrawing Iraqi forces, but these efforts were rejected by Iraq, and Resolution 660 was issued, demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally. After the deadline given to Iraq expired, the United States announced that it was leading an international coalition of 34 countries, known as the “International Coalition Forces for the Liberation of Kuwait.” Military operations lasted 43 days and were considered the largest confrontation since World War II. On February 27, 1991, then-US President George H. W. Bush announced the liberation of Kuwait after 100 hours of ground warfare.

There is no doubt that many lessons can be learned from the crisis, including the importance of unified Gulf action on the political and military levels during crises in general; In other words, how the Arab Gulf states manage security crises, a topic that has not been addressed in many publications. Collective Gulf diplomacy played an important role in mobilizing regional and international positions to condemn the invasion and demand that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and restore all conditions to what they were before August 2, 1990. This resulted in the aforementioned Security Council resolutions, in addition to resolutions by the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Diplomatic work was not easy for the Arab Gulf states, given the divergence of positions within regional and international organizations. The world was divided between two currents: the first openly condemning the invasion, and the second: taking ambiguous positions that oscillated between the two sides. This crisis manifested the characteristics of the three well-known crises: a sudden situation requiring decisive decisions in a very limited time, amid a lack of information or conflicting information. It is worth noting that a committee of foreign ministers from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries was tasked with conducting joint visits to the permanent members of the Security Council, some Arab countries, and other influential countries around the world in order to maintain a unified international position on the crisis.

On the military level, despite the limited numbers of Peninsula Shield forces, they played a crucial role through a strategy that included three objectives: First, to delay, disrupt, and confuse the advance of Iraqi forces toward Saudi Arabian territory; second, to inflict the greatest possible losses on the attacking Iraqi forces; Third: to work on continuously improving the defensive capabilities of the GCC countries in cooperation with Arab forces, which would have hindered the offensive operations of the Iraqi forces, in addition to the pivotal role of the Peninsula Shield Forces through cooperation with the coalition forces against the Iraqi military forces during the liberation of Kuwait.

In my opinion, this crisis holds strategic lessons for the Arab Gulf states. First: the possibility of implementing a joint Gulf defense system, as cooperation between Gulf air forces was an important indicator of that Gulf military cooperation. Second: the concept of Gulf security cohesion, which appeared against Iraqi missile attacks between 1990 and 1991, This was a practical application of the provisions of the Cooperation Council Charter, as well as the Cooperation Council’s Joint Defense Agreement signed later in 2000, particularly Articles 2 and 3, which stipulated that any attack on a Gulf state would be considered an attack on the Council as a whole, requiring measures to be taken to repel that attack. Third: The war involved countries pursuing multiple security options simultaneously, namely activating self-security and regional and international partnerships. Each of the three options was important, albeit to varying degrees.

The Arab Gulf region, which includes countries that share common political, economic, social, historical, and cultural characteristics, is located within a turbulent regional environment, some parties in which have sought to change the regional balance of power. This has prompted the Arab Gulf states to confront and deal with these risks through the GCC system, Among these risks was the crisis of the invasion and liberation of Kuwait, which had significant repercussions on both the security of the Arab Gulf and the wider regional security. This makes it an important occasion to draw lessons and historical experiences on how the Arab Gulf states have successfully managed security crises, a topic that should be of constant concern.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk : Senior Researcher