On August 19, 2025, the Israeli army spokesman announced the start of military exercises in the Red Sea. Although this is not the first time Israel has conducted such exercises, it has raised questions about regional security in that area in general, taking into account three things: First, there is still no integrated security system for all countries bordering the Red Sea. Second, although there are Arab and non-Arab countries bordering the Red Sea, it remains an “Arab lake” given that the Arab countries surrounding it own about 90% of its coastline. Third, the Red Sea is a vital waterway connecting the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the south and the Suez Canal in the north.

Although the purpose of military exercises is to demonstrate deterrence, which many countries in the region have also done in recent years, there are concerns among countries in the region about the increased military presence in this vital waterway. This was expressed by Dr. Badr Abdel Aty, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in November 2024, when he said: “Further militarization of the Red Sea is extremely damaging to global trade and the Egyptian economy.”

These statements are significant, especially given previous indications that the region could become a battleground for regional conflicts. On September 14, 2024, the Iranian government announced the “return of the Iranian Navy’s 98th Fleet to one of the docks of Bandar Abbas port in southern Iran, after completing a 126-day mission in the Red Sea.” According to Iranian sources, the fleet’s mission was to “secure Iranian shipping lines.” It should be noted that Iran sent this fleet in January 2024, followed by India sending a fleet of 10 warships to the northern and central Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the same month, in addition to two already present in that region, bringing the total to 12 Indian warships. China then sent Fleet 46 in February of the same year to accompany Fleet 45 in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the coast of Somalia.

These fleets may be limited in number and purpose, but the broader picture reflects the concept of “militarization of the region.” According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Horn of Africa hosts 19 military bases operated by 16 countries, meaning that some countries have more than one base. The number of these bases has been increasing since 2001. This region is strategically important because it overlooks the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, and its presence allows control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which 10-12% of global trade passes.

Countries and international organizations have also taken a keen interest in protecting maritime navigation in that region, starting with the United States’ establishment of the Prosperity Guardian coalition in 2023 in response to threats to maritime navigation in the Red Sea, followed by the coalition’s efforts to protect it, followed by the European Union sending a naval mission for the same purpose in February 2024, and ending with the NATO mission off the coast of Somalia, called “Ocean Shield,” which was stationed there between 2008 and 2016.

Returning to the beginning, the two important questions are: What are the implications of the military presence in that region for regional security? And what responses are required regionally? Although countries with military bases in the Horn of Africa have implemented rules of engagement to prevent maritime clashes, this is no guarantee that a maritime confrontation will not break out, which would certainly not be limited to the two parties involved, as maritime security in that region is a top priority for both regional and international parties.

In my view, regional responses take three forms. The first is the development of regional mechanisms, including Saudi Arabia’s initiative to establish the Council of States bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, whose founding charter was signed in 2020 in Riyadh. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the council includes seven other countries, and its objectives include “to secure maritime navigation in that international waterway,” in light of the development projects of both Saudi Arabia and Egypt in that region, which require that the region be secure. Second: Resolving the conflict in Yemen, given that maritime security threats are linked to the ability of coastal states to secure and protect their waterways. Third: The ability to resolve other regional conflicts, particularly the tension between Iran and Israel, and the increased likelihood of further confrontations between them, which would affect regional security in general.

In short, the Red Sea region, where regional and international interests intersect, needs more regional efforts to establish a regional security structure, whether by developing existing mechanisms or creating new ones, given the close link between security and the implementation of ambitious development projects, in order to achieve the concept of “cooperative security” rather than “military security.”

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk, Director of Strategic and International Studies Program