The Imperative for Decisive ITU Action Against Iran: Safeguarding Global Communication Lifelines in the Strait of Hormuz
Today, almost 99 percent of international data traffic flows through underwater fiber-optic cables, the stability of global telecommunications has become a cornerstone of economic security, national defense, and everyday life. However, this vital infrastructure faces an escalating threat from Iran, who has repeatedly signaled toward the targeting of communication lines. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as the United Nations specialized agency responsible for coordinating global ICT standards and spectrum management, must now move beyond diplomatic niceties and impose strong, enforceable measures against Tehran. Failure to act now would not only embolden a rogue actor, but also jeopardize the physical backbone of the digital world.
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a strategic waterway for oil tankers to pass through; it is a critical artery for submarine cables that carry the lifeblood of the internet worldwide. Several major international cable systems traverse or terminate in the waters adjacent to the Strait, including segments of the South-East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe (SMW) cable network, the Gulf Bridge International cable, and various regional links connecting the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Europe and Asia. These cables handle trillions of dollars in daily financial transactions, enable real-time global supply-chain coordination, and support essential services from telemedicine to military command-and-control systems. A single deliberate severance in this narrow chokepoint only 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest could instantly hurt connectivity for entire regions, causing cascading outages across the Middle East, Europe, and beyond. Repair operations in such contested waters would take weeks or months, exposing governments and businesses to unprecedented economic losses estimated in the billions, which will eventually cause a severe global economic decline.
Iran has made its intentions alarmingly clear. Senior Iranian officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders have repeatedly threatened to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait in response to any perceived aggression; language that now extends implicitly and sometimes explicitly to underwater infrastructure. Tehran’s naval doctrine emphasizes asymmetric warfare, including the deployment of submarines, fast-attack boats, and remotely operated vehicles capable of locating and damaging cable landing stations or the cables themselves. Past incidents of unexplained cable cuts in the broader region, combined with Iran’s documented cyber and hybrid operations against critical infrastructure, underscore the credibility of these threats. In a time of increased regional tension, the risk is no longer theoretical: an Iranian decision to target communications could be executed with plausible deniability, yet the strategic impact would be immediate and devastating at a global level.
The ITU possesses both the mandate and the tools to respond decisively. Under its constitution and the framework of the World Telecommunication Development Conference resolutions, the Union is empowered to protect the integrity of international telecommunication networks. Strong measures should include the temporary suspension of Iran’s voting rights within ITU study groups, the designation of Iranian territorial waters and airspace as high-risk zones for cable-laying and maintenance operations, and the establishment of a dedicated ITU task force for critical submarine cable security. Such actions would send an unambiguous signal that the global community will not tolerate the weaponization of shared digital infrastructure. Moreover, the ITU should collaborate with the International Maritime Organization and the UN Security Council to integrate cable protection into broader maritime security protocols, including mandatory real-time monitoring and rapid-response repair agreements for Hormuz-adjacent routes.
International efforts must extend far beyond the ITU. The United States, European Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries – whose economies depend heavily on these cables – should lead a coordinated coalition. This includes accelerating the deployment of redundant cable routes that bypass the strait, investing in advanced seabed surveillance technologies, and establishing a multilateral insurance and compensation fund for cable damage caused by state actors. Private sector cable operators, many of whom already operate under ITU coordination, must be incentivized to share threat intelligence and invest in protective technologies, such as distributed acoustic sensing, along vulnerable segments.
The stakes could not be higher. The submarine cables of the Strait of Hormuz represent more than engineering necessity; they embody the interconnectedness that underpins modern civilization. Allowing Iran to hold this infrastructure hostage would erode the rules-based international order and invite copycat behavior from other authoritarian regimes. The ITU must act now with the firmness the moment demands before rhetoric becomes reality, and the lights of global connectivity flicker out in one of the world’s most critical digital corridors.
Ali Ebrahim Faqih, Senior Analyst
