Ukraine Between Two Grinding Forces: Russian Power and American Calculations

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The verbal clash between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky captured the attention of millions around the world, particularly because it is unusual for intergovernmental relations to be debated live on air. We are more accustomed to seeing smiles for the cameras—even if the actual discussions behind closed doors were far more tense. This controversial encounter reminded me of a conversation I had with a colleague about three years ago. He asked, “If you had one piece of advice for the Ukrainian president, what would it be?” I immediately replied: “Reach an agreement with the Russian president to prevent an invasion.”

Perhaps my response was not convincing at the time—considering NATO’s power as a deterrent against any threats to Europe. But as I previously wrote, Ukraine’s fundamental dilemma lies in its classification as a “buffer state”—a concept that applies to many countries that sit between conflicting powers. In such cases, the wisdom and rationality of decisions by ruling elites become critical. Russia’s primary concern was Ukraine’s accession to NATO. The indications of Ukraine moving toward that goal were among the primary triggers of the war and the current situation.

The story may be well known to many, but the pressing question now is: What are President Zelensky’s options?

Should he offer concessions to Russia or accept a settlement based on the battlefield situation—sacrificing the territories Ukraine has lost over the past three years? Should he accept American proposals? Or should he seek a European security umbrella?

Russia’s response to Zelensky’s recent announcement expressing openness to negotiations was swift. President Vladimir Putin firmly rejected any temporary ceasefire and stated, “Moscow must pursue a peace in Ukraine that ensures long-term Russian security and sustainable development.”

He added: “We must choose a peace that suits us.”

This reflects Russia’s firm position, not just toward Ukraine, but also toward the West and the European continent. The war has revealed Europe’s security vulnerabilities and its need for a security alternative that complements—but does not contradict—NATO. Notably, Russia has raised other issues that may be brought into broader negotiations with the U.S., including the Iranian nuclear file. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said: “Russia is developing mutually beneficial relations with Iran and is ready to do everything possible to resolve the nuclear issue.” He added, “Iran is a partner and ally of Russia.”

This means that intertwining the Ukraine talks with other complex files in U.S.–Russia relations will certainly come at Ukraine’s expense. Regardless of the outcomes of the war, Russia still has the capabilities and resources to continue the conflict for years to come.

The second option would be Zelensky accepting U.S. proposals, particularly after the U.S. administration announced a freeze on military aid to Ukraine. Washington’s role is critical in these negotiations, especially in providing security guarantees. Since Ukraine is not a NATO member, these guarantees would not come through NATO but rather directly from the United States. The question, however, is: At what cost?

There might be a need for a formal agreement reflecting this—but it wouldn’t mean a full reset like the Minsk Agreement of 2015. Too much blood has been shed, losses have been incurred by both sides, and the facts on the ground have changed.

It’s also worth noting that Zelensky himself may not be Washington’s preferred figure to lead peace talks. There have already been discussions between members of the U.S. administration and Ukrainian opposition leaders about holding early presidential elections in Ukraine.

At the same time, Zelensky’s statement that Ukraine is ready to sign an agreement with the United States granting it preferential access to Ukraine’s mineral wealth and natural resources is significant.

The third option is seeking a European security umbrella for Ukraine.

However, Europe remains divided:

Ukraine’s EU membership is still under debate.

NATO membership—intertwined with EU membership in many cases—is also uncertain.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated: “Ukraine’s membership can be discussed in the future, but it will not be part of any peace deal.”

Meanwhile, the EU has announced €30 billion in aid for Ukraine in 2025, and several European countries have expressed readiness to send troops to Ukraine—though this comes with risks, as NATO would not defend these troops since it does not constitute an attack on NATO territory under Article 5.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s offer to place France’s nuclear arsenal under European command to counter Russian threats was seen by Moscow as a direct threat.

Still, the EU has a long way to go before becoming a viable security alternative to NATO.

Zelensky’s participation in the EU summit on March 6, 2025, focused on Ukrainian support and developing a European security umbrella amid strained EU–U.S. relations, was telling. During the summit, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, declared:

“This is an existential moment for Europe; it must be able to defend itself.”

However, Hungary’s opposition to supporting Ukraine was also evident.

Of course, none of these scenarios can be guaranteed—as is often the case in crises involving strategic rivalries between major powers (Russia vs. NATO), especially where nuclear balance is involved. While Russia holds a relative advantage, the Ukrainian crisis offers important lessons:

Studying the behavior of buffer states not just according to their own interests, but also the power dynamics of the rival states they sit between.

Understanding how transformations in the international order influence regional conflicts.

From the $65 billion provided by the Biden administration to Ukraine since the start of the war to the complete halt of aid under Trump, we see a shift that underscores the volatility of international alignments.

The adage “No permanent enemies, no permanent friends—only permanent interests” is embodied in the Ukrainian crisis, which will undoubtedly remain a focal point for international relations scholars in the years to come.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej

Dr. Ashraf Keshk, Senior Research Fellow

Last Update: September 15, 2025