The Non-Financial Benefits of Bahrain’s Demands for Compensation
The Kingdom of Bahrain’s latest communication with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) explicitly raises the issue of compensation from Iran for the damage caused by its extrajudicial attacks on the Kingdom. Behind the ostensibly financial motivation for lodging the demands is a more subtle strategy aiming at locking in Iran’s legal liability at an early stage.
The letter – which constitutes the 11th component of an ongoing series of Bahraini-authored communications with the UNSC regarding the war – had two core messages, both of which were very straightforward. The first is that Iran’s attacks on Bahrain were in flagrant violation of international law, citing UNSC resolution 2817. The resolution condemned Iran’s “egregious attacks” against the Arabian Gulf states and Jordan, in addition to Iran’s attacks on ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. It was notable for having the highest number of cosponsoring nations in history – 135 UN member states. When put to vote, it secured 13 approvals and two abstentions, ensuring an unusually strong level of support from the international community.
The second key message was that Bahrain was legally entitled to compensation from Iran in light of its unambiguously illegal attacks on the Kingdom’s civilian infrastructure. The document cited numerous examples of key energy and industrial installations that were deliberately targeted by Iranian drones and missiles with the express aim of damaging them.
Given that the conflict is ongoing, Bahrain will have to be patient in its wait for compensation – such claims are rarely resolved quickly, and are frequently resisted through a broad range of legal chicanery. Nevertheless, there exists positive precedents, such as Iraq being forced to compensate Kuwait following its invasion of the GCC state in 1990, and Libya’s compensation of the victims’ families in 2003 after the Lockerbie PanAm airliner terrorist attack. Under such circumstances, the financial transfers play both a restitutive and punitive role, sending a signal to prospective aggressors that they cannot act with impunity, and to prospective victims that the international community will not remain silent before injustice.
Whatever the outcomes of the claims – and however long the process takes – there exist substantive, proximate returns to Bahrain’s initiative. The most important is that it locks in Iran’s legal liability at an early stage, preventing Iran from subsequently claiming that the validity of any claims have expired. It also maintains the narrative that Iran has violated international law through its actions, and that the countries suffering from these violations regard the actions as unacceptable.
In the long-run, Bahrain is also positioned to be part of the negotiations, as it has valid compensation claims – ones that have been legitimized by the UNSC. It is too early to say if a grand regional bargain will occur, but should one materialize, Bahrain has clear grounds to being a party to such a conference. Notably, the final settlement might not literally include Bahrain receiving financial compensation for the damage unlawfully inflicted upon it, but its valid claims might be used as leverage for an alternative favorable outcome.
Bahrain’s compensation claims are therefore best understood not as a narrow financial demand, but as a strategic instrument to shape the legal and diplomatic terrain of the conflict. By acting early and decisively, the Kingdom ensures that regardless of how the war ends, it enters any future settlement not as a bystander, but as a claimant with recognized rights and leverage.
Dr. Omar Ahmad AlUbaydli, Studies and Research Director
