Electronic Interference in the Strait of Hormuz: When the Signal Becomes a Battlespace
Maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz is no longer defined solely by naval mines, fast attack craft, and anti-ship missiles. Over the past two years, a quieter yet far-reaching threat has emerged: the jamming and spoofing of satellite-based navigation systems. In a waterway through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes, and where commercial tankers and military vessels operate in close proximity, any disruption to a ship’s ability to determine its location, or to others’ ability to identify that location, poses a direct risk to maritime safety and the stability of global energy markets.
Electronic interference is not new to the Arabian Gulf. However, its scale and intensity have increased markedly with each round of regional tensions. In June 2025, data from maritime intelligence company Windward, monitored by the Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center (MICA Center), indicated that approximately 970 vessels per day were affected by positioning signal interference near Iranian waters. The phenomenon reached unprecedented levels following the outbreak of military confrontation in late February 2026. Windward reported that more than 1,100 commercial vessels experienced interference with GPS and Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals during the first 24 hours of military operations. As the crisis expanded, the number of affected vessels exceeded 1,650 during the first month of the conflict.
At the same time, data from S&P Global showed that vessel transits through the Strait had declined by more than 90 percent by late May 2026 compared to pre-war levels. This decline was primarily driven by military risks, transit restrictions, and soaring insurance costs rather than by electronic interference alone.
A distinction must be made between two related methods of disruption. The first is jamming, which involves broadcasting powerful radio signals that overwhelm receivers and block the weak signals transmitted by satellites. The second is spoofing, whereby counterfeit signals are transmitted to deceive navigation receivers into calculating a false position.
The greatest risk lies in the fact that the disruption extends beyond navigation equipment itself. It also affects the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which vessels rely upon to exchange identity, location, and navigational information in order to avoid collisions. Because AIS typically derives positional data from satellite-navigation receivers, interference or spoofing can result in the transmission of inaccurate coordinates. Consequently, vessels have appeared on tracking platforms clustered in geometric formations over airports, nuclear facilities, or even inland locations. Such anomalies are widely recognized indicators of location spoofing and data manipulation, causing ships to be displayed in geographically impossible locations.
Recent data reveal a lesser-known dimension of the phenomenon. In August 2026, Windward found that 393 out of 642 recorded transit events through the Strait, representing 61.2 percent of the total, had not actually occurred but were instead artifacts created by corrupted location data. Significantly, the actual movement of vessels remained largely unchanged during periods of intense interference compared to periods of relative calm. According to the company’s analysis, the difference between the two periods amounted to just 1.2 percent.
This suggests that, at its current stage, electronic interference does not necessarily prevent ships from transiting the Strait. Rather, it undermines the credibility of the maritime picture itself. This has direct implications for shipping and insurance companies, oil market assessments, and naval forces seeking to distinguish between genuine suspicious activity and misleading technical anomalies.
The consequences extend well beyond navigation. Electronic interference represents a form of “gray-zone” pressure, enabling actors to influence commercial traffic without crossing the threshold of conventional military attack. Although no comprehensive official attribution exists for all interference incidents in the region, statements by Iranian officials regarding the use of GPS disruption technologies for military and security purposes, coupled with Western assessments of Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities, underscore the importance of treating this issue as a component of the broader regional military competition.
The challenge is compounded by the overlap between navigational interference and other maritime risks, including naval mines and incidents involving commercial vessels in the Strait. Independent verification of the circumstances surrounding some of these incidents, as well as responsibility for them, often remains difficult. Moreover, other actors also employ electronic jamming to protect critical facilities from drones and precision-guided munitions, making the electromagnetic environment in the Gulf increasingly congested and complex. Against the backdrop of a dense military presence, the inability to reliably distinguish between civilian and military vessels may contribute to miscalculation and unintended escalation.
These developments require the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the Kingdom of Bahrain, to treat signal security as an integral component of maritime security. This begins with strengthening terrestrial navigation alternatives such as eLoran systems and coastal correction stations, thereby reducing exclusive dependence on satellite-based navigation. It also calls for the establishment of a shared GCC network for monitoring signal interference and disseminating real-time data to vessels and maritime coordination centers. In addition, maritime situational awareness should be built upon a multi-source approach that integrates satellite imagery, radar data, and radio-frequency monitoring rather than relying solely on AIS information.
Equally important is ensuring that maritime crews retain proficiency in traditional navigation methods, including radar navigation and visual positioning techniques, while adopting rigorous procedures for cross-checking navigational data before entering the Strait.
From a diplomatic perspective, there is a growing need to promote the development of international frameworks and standards within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) aimed at protecting civilian navigation and maritime communication systems from intentional electronic interference. This remains an area requiring the development of clearer international norms rather than the implementation of an already established international agreement.
Such efforts align with the role assumed by the Kingdom of Bahrain during its non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (2026-2027), particularly its initiative to convene a high-level discussion on the safety and protection of maritime routes during its Security Council presidency in April 2026.
The struggle over the signal in the Strait of Hormuz serves as a reminder that the security of critical maritime corridors is no longer determined solely by what floats on the surface of the water, but also by what travels through the electromagnetic spectrum. Investment in navigational resilience has therefore become a strategic necessity for safeguarding GCC economies and maintaining stability in global energy markets.
More broadly, the challenge highlights the growing importance of advanced technologies in protecting maritime security at a time when GCC states remain heavily dependent on vital sea lanes for international trade. Ensuring future maritime security requires more than agreements on freedom of navigation; it demands sustained investment in capabilities, particularly technological capabilities, to protect oil tankers and commercial shipping throughout the Gulf.
This priority is evident both within the framework of Gulf collective defense and through international partnerships. Notably, during the Joint Defense Council meeting held in Manama on 10 November 2026, GCC defense ministers approved the establishment of an advanced military headquarters for the Unified Military Command in the sister state of Kuwait, assigning the necessary forces to support its mission and further strengthen the Gulf’s collective defense architecture. Complementing these efforts are the international partnerships pursued by GCC states, which continue to provide valuable opportunities for acquiring advanced maritime and security technologies.
In an era where a manipulated signal can create strategic consequences comparable to traditional military threats, safeguarding the integrity of navigation systems is becoming as important as protecting the ships that depend upon them.
Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.
Rawana AlDajani, Associate Analyst in the International and Strategic Studies Program (Derasat Center)