Amid discussions about ensuring maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz —an issue that is currently dominating much of the world’s attention and has been both a cause and a consequence of recent developments—some unconfirmed media reports have stated that the Sultanate of Oman, through its discussions with Iran on this matter, has put forward a proposal—according to those reports – to establish a joint regional mechanism for managing the Strait of Hormuz, involving voluntary fees paid by users of the strait, with these fees earmarked for navigation services, environmental protection, and search-and-rescue operations. Under this mechanism, Iran would not have sole control over the strait, similar to the mechanism in place in the Strait of Malacca. This raises the question: Can this mechanism actually be implemented in the Strait of Hormuz?
The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most important international waterways, through which oil and gas are transported from the Middle East to China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries; it also accounts for a significant portion of global trade, estimated at approximately 22 percent. There are three countries bordering the strait: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. These countries play a key role in ensuring maritime navigation in the waters within their territorial boundaries. They exercise this responsibility through three main mechanisms. First: The establishment in 2007 of a permanent cooperation mechanism, whose mission is to support dialogue and promote maritime traffic through a fund dedicated to this purpose. Second: Joint patrols, established in 2004 to enhance maritime security coordination in order to counter various maritime threats. Third: The use of technology to support and facilitate maritime navigation by providing ships with real-time charts and navigational data.

A closer look at the mechanism in place in the Strait of Malacca reveals that it reflects three key points. First: the commitment of the three states not to impede maritime navigation in this international strait, in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Second: The measures taken by the three countries regarding maritime navigation reflect the essence of the codes of conduct for maritime security—codes that are being implemented in certain regions of the world, including West Africa, and which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is seeking to implement in the South China Sea; these codes have played an important role in enhancing maritime security. Third: The three countries’ conviction that ensuring safe navigation in this strait constitutes both a regional and an international responsibility. Although the major powers concerned with ensuring the safe passage of ships through this strait do not deploy military forces or form naval alliances for this purpose, they contribute to maritime security by supporting the Maritime Navigation Fund.
Compared to the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz, this mechanism may not be suitable for implementation for six reasons.
First: Iran’s threat to maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is linked to the issue of maritime boundaries, as Iran continues to occupy the three Emirati islands and considers its territorial waters to extend from the Iranian coast starting from those islands, which means that a large portion of the strait is, from its perspective, considered its territorial waters. In contrast, in 2023, Malaysia and Indonesia managed to resolve their maritime boundary disputes after an 18-year conflict.

Second: Iran’s failure to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as it signed but did not ratify it. During one of his statements at a Security Council session, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations declared that “Iran is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and is not bound by its provisions,” unlike the states bordering the Strait of Malacca, which are committed to implementing the Convention’s provisions without violation.
Third: Despite an imbalance of power among the three states bordering the Strait of Malacca—with Indonesia having the largest population and Singapore possessing a highly advanced financial and technological hub— and Malaysia combines the advantages of population density and economic growth—this imbalance has not been exploited by the largest country to exert hegemony over the others. The situation is different in the case of Iran, which, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 until the present, has pursued a regional hegemonic project that has remained unchanged despite shifts in the ruling elites. One of the tools of this project is leveraging its status as a maritime nation and using the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip to threaten regional and international security.
Fourth: Regardless of the nature of relations among the three states bordering the Strait of Malacca, they are simultaneously members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which provides a framework for regional security through which coordination takes place to regulate the regional behavior of these states in accordance with the Association’s charter. In contrast, the Arabian Gulf region is witnessing two divergent visions of regional security. The first is that of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising its six member states, and the second is Iran’s vision of regional security, which opposes any foreign presence in the region—a stance that is reflected in maritime security issues.
Fifth: Iran’s refusal to accept the idea of regional maritime cooperation except through the initiatives it has announced, which coincided with escalating tensions with the United States. These initiatives took the form of general principles without clear implementation mechanisms or genuine commitments on Iran’s part to address issues of maritime navigation security and regional security in general in good faith.
Sixth: The maritime navigation arrangements in the Strait of Malacca were established in response to threats of maritime piracy and, prior to that, considerations of maritime and environmental safety and the regulation of ship traffic—threats that did not originate from any specific country, whereas Iran, according to this argument, represents the primary threat to maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, banking on the fact that a number of regional states—including the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait—do not have alternative maritime outlets for their trade with the outside world.
To begin with, it can be said that the significance of the Omani proposal does not mean it will be the final one, given the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz for maritime navigation and Iran’s ongoing efforts to use the strait as a bargaining chip in its crises with the United States. There is no doubt that the success of regional states, in cooperation with key players in the international community, in developing a permanent mechanism to safeguard maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—which represents a clear example of the overlap between regional and global security—will have a profound impact on the Arab Gulf states and the entire regional security architecture.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk, Director of International and Strategic Studies Program