Iran’s Missile and Drone Programs and Security in the Arabian Gulf
Amid discussions about holding a second round of negotiations between the United States and Iran, controversy has arisen regarding the terms of the anticipated agreement—whether it will be a framework agreement laying the groundwork for negotiations toward a final agreement, or the final agreement itself reached during these negotiations. While it is important for the agreement to address all sources of Iranian threats to the security of the Arabian Gulf and regional security—particularly the issue of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programs—I believe that Iran’s missile and drone programs are no less serious than the aforementioned issues, for five reasons:
First: U.S. sources confirm that Iran retains 40% of its stockpile of attack drones and 60% of its missile launchers, which means that restricting its efforts to produce more of them is imperative.
Second: Iran’s development of generations of attack drones reinforces the concept of asymmetric warfare, which does not take place between regular armies but rather through the use of military technology to inflict the greatest possible losses at the lowest cost, by targeting maritime targets—for example—such as oil tankers or oil production platforms in the region in the future.
Third: While restrictions can be imposed on nuclear programs, the same is not easily achievable for missiles and drones, given their ease of production and the ability to conceal signs of their development—unlike the inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency at sites related to Iran’s nuclear program.
Fourth: Missiles and drones are among the means by which Iran supports its regional proxies, as their components can be easily disassembled and concealed within maritime shipments. For example, in July 2025, Yemeni security forces thwarted an attempt to smuggle 750 tons of ammunition from Iran to the Houthis via the Red Sea, including shipments of naval and air missile systems, an air defense system, modern radars, drones, eavesdropping devices, anti-armor missiles, B-10 artillery, tracking lenses, sniper rifles and ammunition, and military equipment.
Fifth: The expiration in October 2023 of the restrictions contained in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015 regarding Iran’s ballistic missile program, which included a ban on the export of technologies, materials, and components necessary for the manufacture of missiles in Iran, as well as their export. These restrictions remained in place for eight years following the signing of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 group, which led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July of that same year. This was a UN resolution, reflecting the international community’s concerns regarding programs no less serious than the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz.
In my view, the Iranian threats should not be compartmentalized, as all sources of the Iranian threat to the security of the Arabian Gulf and regional security are no longer merely theoretical propositions, academic narratives, or Western intelligence reports; rather, they were confirmed by the recent war, which reflected the concept of asymmetric warfare, as military technology was used on a large scale, and served as a clear demonstration of the disproportion between a low-cost attack and the exorbitant costs of intercepting it.
On the other hand, the anticipated agreement—which involves resolving some or all of the outstanding issues—will be reached while the Iranian regime remains in place. Regardless of its strength or weakness, it will represent an extension of an Iranian project that continues to prioritize the concept of revolution over the state. This project is based primarily on the logic of human and military superiority, and on leveraging Iran’s status as a maritime state. The easiest path for Iran—and the one furthest from the scrutiny and control of the international community—is to accelerate the production of missiles of various ranges and to develop the most advanced attack drones, which means that vital facilities in the Arabian Gulf region will remain within range of Iranian targeting.
The recent conflict was not the first time missiles and drones have been used. Despite sanctions and restrictions on Iran’s missile production, Aramco’s oil facilities were targeted in 2019 by Iranian missiles and drones, in addition to a series of attacks on oil tankers in various areas along the Arabian Gulf coast between 2019 and 2022, which at the time foreshadowed the outbreak of a new tanker war.
In short, it is a mistake to reduce the Iranian threat to the nuclear issue. As long as the Iranian regime persists with its ideology and regional agenda, there remains a need to restrict its missile programs and drone development, even if this requires seeking a UN resolution on the matter.
Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.
Dr. Ashraf Mohamed Kishk, Director of Strategic and International Studies
