Non-state armed groups present a fundamental challenge in contemporary conflicts: the disparity between their capacity to inflict harm and the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to hold them accountable. This issue partially intersects with Mary Kaldor’s thesis on “new wars,” which highlights the use of violence against civilians and forced displacement as methods for controlling populations and reshaping the political landscape. In this context, an “accountability gap” emerges—the difficulty of enforcing legal norms, identifying those responsible for violations, and prosecuting them—which fosters impunity and compounds the toll borne by civilians.

The attacks that struck facilities at five Saudi airports between October 5 and October 11, 2026, serve as a clear illustration of this cost. These included King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Airport in Jazan, as well as the airports in Najran, Abha, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam. Notably, the attack on King Khalid International Airport on October 10—as reported by the General Authority of Civil Aviation—resulted in 12 deaths and 309 injuries. Aggregating the figures released by the Authority for all these incidents, the total toll reached at least 19 deaths and 359 injuries. The Houthi group claimed responsibility for several of these attacks, while the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that other attacks originated from Iraqi territory.

Given the resulting civilian casualties, these events necessitate an ethical reckoning that transcends mere military calculations. The lives of civilians cannot be reduced to a tool for political coercion. Religions, customs, and international conventions all affirm the impermissibility of such attacks and establish clear rules for the conduct of hostilities. Consequently, the Houthi group’s use of religious discourse to justify attacks against non-combatants creates a contradiction between their claims of legitimacy and the ethical requirements that such legitimacy entails.

Given this reality, a legal response necessitates distinguishing between three levels of responsibility. The first concerns the executing group and its individual members; Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions obligates parties to a non-international armed conflict to ensure a minimum standard of humane treatment for those not directly participating in hostilities—a requirement supplemented by customary international law regarding the protection of civilians. This assumes the classification of the events as a non-international armed conflict, a determination that requires independent analysis. Intentionally directing attacks against protected civilians constitutes a war crime, provided that the necessary legal elements are met and the acts are linked to an armed conflict. A gap in accountability arises here, as prosecution before the International Criminal Court is subject to specific jurisdictional requirements and admissibility criteria; the Court’s jurisdiction does not apply automatically.

The second level concerns the supporting state. Under Article 8 of the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the conduct of a group may be attributed to a state if it is proven that the actions were carried out under that state’s instructions, or under its direction or effective control in the context of the specific operation in question. Funding or the provision of arms alone is not sufficient to attribute all violations to the supporting party—though such support may give rise to independent liability if it violates international obligations, such as an arms embargo. The challenge here lies in the difficulty of proving “effective control” over each individual operation.

The third level concerns the state from whose territory the attacks are launched. Its responsibility is assessed based on whether it was aware of the threat and failed to take reasonable measures available to it to prevent such acts. The Saudi Foreign Ministry’s demand that Iraq prevent its territory from being used as a launchpad for attacks can be understood through the principle of “due diligence”—a concept for which the 1949 *Corfu Channel* case serves as a key judicial precedent. The accountability gap here arises from the complex evidentiary requirements: identifying the perpetrator and the nature of the target, establishing a link between the supporters and the act itself, and determining the extent to which the relevant authorities failed to prevent it.

This analysis points toward a comprehensive course of action that addresses each of these levels. Regarding the group carrying out the attacks, the process begins with documenting violations according to professional standards, preserving evidence and its chain of custody, and making this information available to investigative bodies and relevant UN mechanisms—including the Panel of Experts established under Resolution 2140 (2014), within the scope of its mandate to support the sanctions regime. Regarding state sponsors, the process requires tracking supply networks and enforcing the arms embargo mandated by Resolution 2216 (2015)—which, under Resolution 2624 (2022), was extended to include the Houthis as an entity.

On the political track, there is a need for verifiable arrangements to consolidate arms under the control of state institutions, while simultaneously subjecting those very institutions to accountability. Throughout all stages of the conflict and negotiations, the protection of civilians must be upheld as a mandatory obligation. Consequently, the preservation of civilian life serves as a benchmark for the seriousness of any settlement, while closing the accountability gap becomes a prerequisite for building sustainable regional stability.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Tasneem Abdulla Isa, Research Associate