Understanding the nature of non-state actors in the Middle East poses a significant challenge to efforts aimed at rebuilding the regional security architecture and restoring the stability of nation-states. Amidst the intertwining of internal crises with regional and international tensions, the phenomenon of armed groups has given rise to complex issues affecting state sovereignty, the foundations of international law, and enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, it is crucial to study this phenomenon by analyzing the roles, functions, and evolutionary trajectories of these groups. This requires shifting from crisis management and piecemeal interventions toward comprehensive strategies grounded in consolidating state authority, enforcing the law, and disarming combatants—all of which are fundamental prerequisites for achieving stability and sustainable recovery in the region.

Any realistic approach to the phenomenon of armed groups hinges on distinguishing between the nature and objectives of these organizations; recognizing the clear disparities in their patterns is the cornerstone for constructing any political or security pathway capable of yielding sustainable results. Armed groups do not constitute a monolithic bloc but rather fall into two primary categories: organizations acting as proxies for external powers—lacking any genuine national agenda—and organizations that originated from local or societal grievances and could, under the right conditions, be reintegrated under the state’s authority. This distinction necessitates a dual-track strategy: the first case requires severing all financial and logistical lifelines and ties, while the second demands the formulation of comprehensive political settlements that address the underlying issues stemming from local grievances. Given the current regional landscape, two fundamental dilemmas hinder the establishment of stability. The first is that these conflicts rapidly transcend their local scope, as most of the groups involved are linked to external entities. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated by thinker Barry Buzan’s concept of “Regional Security Complexes,” wherein the security of regional states is so deeply intertwined that national security cannot be decoupled from regional and global security. The second dilemma lies in the evident inadequacy of international enforcement mechanisms—despite the existence of robust and comprehensive legal frameworks established by the UN Security Council. This is clearly demonstrated in the cases of Lebanon and Yemen: regarding Lebanon, Resolution 1701 (2006) explicitly mandates that the Lebanese state hold exclusive authority over arms and governance; meanwhile, Resolution 2216 (2015) concerning Yemen—adopted under Chapter VII—uses even more direct language, demanding that the Houthi terrorist group surrender all weaponry seized from military and security institutions. Thus, while a comprehensive international legal framework is clearly in place for both cases, the real gap lies in the absence of effective mechanisms for enforcement on the ground.

Consequently, this procedural shortcoming entails significant repercussions that extend beyond the geographical boundaries of the conflict zones, impacting four vital areas: Persistent insecurity—driven by the proliferation of armed groups—fuels crises of forced displacement and irregular migration that place direct strain on the economies of neighboring countries, alongside the spread of organized crime and shadow economies based on arms and drug smuggling and human trafficking. Furthermore, there is a heightened risk of humanitarian disasters arising from armed groups monopolizing national resources and wealth, as well as direct threats to the safety of international navigation and trade; these entail exorbitant costs that burden the global economy as a whole.

When seeking practical models for addressing disarmament and reintegration, the Colombian experience offers a unique case study. Following a conflict with the FARC movement that lasted nearly fifty years, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2261 in 2016, establishing a UN mission to monitor the ceasefire and verify disarmament through a tripartite mechanism involving the government, the movement, and the United Nations. By mid-2017, this process had resulted in the handover of over 7,000 individual weapons—stored and documented under full UN supervision—followed by the dismantling of arms caches and the destruction of unstable munitions. This culminated in Resolution 2366, which established a second mission to oversee the security and political reintegration of combatants, ultimately transforming the movement into a political party. An analysis of this model reveals the integration of four key elements: an explicit Security Council mandate; observers on the ground authorized to oversee the actual handover of weapons; sustainable international guarantees to support the reintegration process; and the preservation of state institutional cohesion and continuity throughout the transition period.

Based on these factors, the path to resolving the issue of armed groups hinges on three main priorities. The first is the need for the international community to maintain consistency and steadfastness in how these groups are classified; constant fluctuation and shifting designations provide them with room to maneuver and undermine the cumulative pressure exerted upon them—as exemplified by the case of the Houthi group. The second priority involves establishing a UN verification and disarmament mechanism—backed by an explicit Security Council mandate—to handle collection, registration, and direct field verification, replacing traditional inspection missions. The third priority entails focusing efforts on dismantling financing networks and supply chains by tracking the components of drones and missile systems, and by utilizing the tools of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter the illicit financial flows that serve as the lifeblood sustaining these groups.

Note: This article has been automatically translated, the full article is available in Arabic.

Abdulrahman Ebrahim Alfezea, Senior Analyst