Why escalation dominance is not formal game theory but is still useful
The Iranian conflict that began in late February 2026 has witnessed repeated use of the phrase “escalation dominance” by analysts. Social scientists trained in formal game theory are often left puzzled because the concept sounds like it should be part of the formal curriculum, yet they never covered it, leaving them wondering if they were sick that day in PhD Game Theory 601. In fact, it is not a formal game-theoretic concept, yet it is still a useful principle for helping us understand interstate conflict.
Game theory is defined as “the study of interdependent decision-making,” and was established by applied mathematicians working in the middle of the 20th century, before the discipline’s subsummation into economics. In light of the field’s mathematical roots, game theorists are incredibly precise scholars. That includes providing a strict checklist for what is required to properly define a “game” (conflict scenario), with the key ingredients being the players (actors), the available strategies (options), and the payoffs (consequences of each option for each player). They also have precise concepts and tools for predicting what the game’s outcome will be, known as the “equilibrium”. There are different types of equilibrium, each of which has various strengths and weaknesses in its capacity as a predictive instrument, and some of the more recognizable examples include Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and sequential equilibrium.
Accordingly, if you read an economics paper that employs game theory to analyze a conflict scenario, such as businesses competing in a product market or political parties vying for an electoral victory, the author will carefully describe the environment with the precision that the discipline demands before deploying the appropriate equilibrium and analyzing the consequences.
In contrast, when international relations experts writing in traditional or social media analyze a conflict, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War or the current Iranian conflict, they inevitably operate much more loosely, steering well clear of the formality required for orthodox game theoretical analysis. They may tacitly specify the key players in the game, outline a subset of the available options, and hint at the returns to each party associated with the various potential outcomes, but do so in a qualitative and incomplete way that renders their coverage
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virtually meaningless to a game theorist. Notably, this is suitable, since writing for mainstream audiences is essentially distinct from addressing the academic community.
Usually, the loose, heuristic-driven analysis that appears in popular contexts steers clear of formal terms like the jargon that typifies modern game theory. Yet – somewhat atypically – international relations experts sometimes infuse their watered-down analysis with a sprinkling of sophisticated-sounding expressions. In the current conflict in Iran, “escalation dominance” has become the favored buzzword which has alienated both lay readers and those with a background in formal game theory.
In fact, the reason that “escalation dominance” is not a term found in a traditional game theory textbook or academic papers is that it developed in an adjacent discipline where mathematical precision was not a core requirement. The term refers to a situation in which one side in a conflict is better positioned to endure, control, or benefit from successive stages of escalation than its opponent. The concept emerged from Cold War strategic theory and assumes that conflicts often proceed through an “escalation ladder,” ranging from limited pressure to severe military confrontation. A state possesses escalation dominance when, at each rung of that ladder, it can impose greater costs, tolerate retaliation more effectively, or credibly threaten further escalation in ways that the opponent cannot match without suffering disproportionate costs.
Notably, this definition is both qualitative and informal, meaning that it lacks a canonical mathematical representation or an agreed-upon method for its operationalization. It is used by experts as a heuristic for analyzing military conflicts. In particular, it is a shorthand for understanding comparative leverage under conditions of strategic interaction and uncertainty, i.e., which actor has the upper hand or controls the situation, and is better able to escalate or de-escalate the conflict according to their interests. It is useful for understanding why the US – despite overwhelming North Vietnam in terms of raw military power – failed to secure victory, with the reason being its lack of escalation dominance or, equivalently, North Vietnam possessing escalation resilience. This is a language useful to a four-star general with decades of war experience but without the mathematical tools needed to solve a “game”.
Ultimately, the tension between formal game theory and concepts like escalation dominance reflects a broader divide between mathematical precision and practical statecraft. The
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former offers rigor, clarity, and internally consistent predictions under carefully specified assumptions, while the latter provides experienced practitioners with a flexible language for grappling with the ambiguity, psychology, and uncertainty of real-world conflict. In that sense, escalation dominance should not be dismissed because it lacks formal precision; rather, it should be understood as a strategic heuristic operating alongside – rather than inside – orthodox game theory.
Dr. Omar Ahmad AlUbaydli, Studies and Research Director
