This study aims to analyze international competition over international waterways, which have long been — and continue to be — among the foundations of international influence and power, in addition to their role in achieving regional balance of power and determining the nature of the global order at the same time. The study proceeds from the general to the specific, addressing the reality and trajectories of this competition at the international level, and then examining the U.S.-led maritime military coalition to secure navigation in the Arabian Gulf as an essential part of this competition. This is carried out through two main axes: the first addresses the features of international competition among Russia, China, and the United States, while the second examines the U.S.-led maritime military coalition to secure navigation in the Arabian Gulf.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: Although the seas have long been — and continue to be — a pillar of global power and influence, there has been a noticeable increase in the pace of international competition over international waterways during recent years in an unprecedented manner and for numerous reasons. This has clearly been reflected in the contents of the national security strategies of major powers, especially the United States and China, as well as in Russia’s proposals for regional security initiatives in the Arabian Gulf region.
Second: In order to properly assess strategic decisions concerning the security of the Arabian Gulf in general, and maritime navigation security in particular, it is necessary to take into consideration developments within three circles: the internal situation in the United States, the regional context of the Arabian Gulf region, and the international framework.
Third: Despite the efforts of both Russia (through the Russian initiative) and China (through the New Silk Road) to counter the American role, whether with regard to international waterways or the American role in the Arabian Gulf region in general, the indisputable reality is that the United States remains the principal guarantor of security in the Arabian Gulf, regardless of statements concerning the possibility of the decline of that role in the future. Nevertheless, the development of the Gulf-American partnership may require greater American engagement in order to put an end to the current regional security crises, in addition to developing Gulf defense capabilities.
Derasat Journal 2019 – Issue 2
- The Derasat Journal aims to publish rigorous studies on issues related to the Arabian Gulf region, neighboring countries, the Middle East, and the world, particularly with regard to security and defense, economics and energy, from a comprehensive strategic perspective.
- To establish an intellectual dialogue among researchers from the Arabian Gulf region and beyond concerning current challenges and ways to address them.
- To enrich knowledge regarding the Arabian Gulf region and issues of regional and global security.
- Submitted studies must demonstrate originality and provide the journal with “added value,” away from repeating traditional topics, particularly in light of the rapid developments taking place in the region and the world.
- Studies submitted for publication should be relevant to issues concerning the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Gulf states, in addition to regional and international issues that have implications for the Gulf region.
- Submitted studies must maintain objectivity and avoid offending individuals, states, religions, or cultures.
- Studies submitted for publication must not have been previously published elsewhere, whether in print or electronically. The journal retains all intellectual property rights. Therefore, the contributor’s receipt of these conditions along with the assignment email implicitly signifies acceptance of them, and accordingly, the author may not republish material published in the journal elsewhere by any print or electronic means.
- Studies submitted for publication must adhere to recognized academic standards, whether regarding scientific methodology or citation and referencing. The journal follows the Chicago style for references and accepts submissions in both Arabic and English.
- The length of studies submitted for publication should range between 6,000–7,000 words, while book reviews and strategic report reviews should range between 1,500–2,000 words.
The themes of each issue of the journal are announced on the journal’s website at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT), inviting submissions related to those themes. Proposals for study ideas are received and discussed by the journal’s Editorial Board, after which the contributor is informed of the Board’s decision. In addition, the Editor-in-Chief may commission certain researchers to prepare studies in line with the journal’s work plan.
- No studies are published in the journal unless approved by the Peer-Review Committee (consisting of two reviewers), which has the authority to accept, reject, or request revisions from the author. The Editor-in-Chief informs the author of the reviewers’ final decision.
- Peer review is conducted by submitting the study without reference to the author’s name, accompanied by the peer-review form published on the journal’s website at the Derasat Center. The form includes four academic criteria: relevance and scope, originality and contribution, theoretical and analytical dimensions, and structure and clarity, in addition to any further comments the reviewer may wish to provide.
- A diverse list of reviewers from various specializations is selected in accordance with the objectives of the journal and the nature of the studies published therein.
Editor-in-Chief
- H.E. Dr. Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed bin Abdulla Al Khalifa
Chairman of the Board of Trustees Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (Derasat) Kingdom of Bahrain
Managing Editor
- Dr. Ashraf Mohammed Keshk
Director of the International and Strategic Studies Program Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT) Kingdom of Bahrain
Dr. Ashraf Mohamed Keshk is a Senior Strategic Studies Expert specializing in Gulf and regional security, with more than three decades of research and academic experience. He received his PhD in Political Science from Cairo University in 2009, with a dissertation on the development of Gulf regional security since 2003: Study on the Impact of NATO Strategy,, which was awarded Best PhD Thesis. In the same year, he obtained a Diploma in Defense Studies from the NATO Defense College in Rome.
He has worked at the Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (Derasat) since 2012 and currently serves as Director of the Program of Strategic and International Studies. His expertise focuses on Gulf security, defense policies, maritime security, and crisis management. He also served as an Academic Mentor and Lecturer at the NATO Defense College from 2009 to 2018 and has participated extensively in international academic, training, and conference activities.
Dr. Keshk has published extensively on Gulf and regional security. His major books include The Development of Gulf Regional Security since 2003: Study on the Impact of NATO Strategy,, Western Policies Toward the Security of the Arabian Gulf, NATO and the Gulf Countries (Springer, 2021), Maritime Security of the Arab Gulf States (Springer, 2022), and Security and Defense Policies of the Arabian Gulf Countries (2024). He also co-edited Gulf Cooperation Council Achievements and Challenges in 2025.
Associate Editors
- Omar Al-Ubaydli
Studies and Research Director
Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT), Bahrain
- Dr. Abdullah Al-Abbasi
Director of the Energy and Environment Program
Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (DERASAT), Bahrain
Members
- Dr. Christian Koch
Executive Manager, Gulf Research Center Foundation Brussels and Director of Research
Gulf Research Center Kingdom of Belgium/ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- Dr. Osamah Alsayeghi
Research Scientist
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) Nonresident Scholar, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy State of Kuwait
- Dr. Moataz Salama
Director, Arabian Gulf Program and Head of the Arab and Regional Studies Unit
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies Arab Republic of Egypt
- Dr. Athraa Sayed Abbas Al-Mosawi
Dean of Graduate Studies & Scientific Research, University of Bahrain
Member of the Board of Trustees, Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies (Derasat) Kingdom of Bahrain
This is the second volume of Derasat’s Journal 2019 (Volume 11). In the foreword, Dr. Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, examines the subject of, “The Kingdom of Bahrain and the Security of Marine Corridors”. The journal goes onto include studies on the Gulf States, as well as a files on naval security, and the threats emanating from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps that challenge Gulf states and regional security. This volume also includes several book reviews, and an overview of proceedings from the Middle East Military Technology Conference 2019.
International Competition over International Waterways: The U.S.-Led Maritime Military Coalition to Secure Navigation in the Gulf as a Model
Maritime Security of the Gulf States: Threats and Capabilities
This paper aims to examine the threats to maritime security facing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly in light of the attacks targeting oil tankers off the coast of the United Arab Emirates and in the Gulf of Oman during 2019, which revived memories of the Tanker War scenario during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. The study also seeks to examine and analyze the mechanisms adopted by the Gulf states to preserve maritime security.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: With the intensification of regional conflicts and the persistence of crises, maritime security for the Gulf states in general, and energy security in particular, are increasingly affected. Oil facilities and strategic oil transportation routes continue to be targets for armed terrorist groups and the states sponsoring them, which has sounded alarm bells regarding the necessity of establishing collective mechanisms to protect energy security in the Arabian Gulf. The region no longer faces only traditional threats such as piracy and smuggling operations, but also threats targeting energy itself, the backbone of the economies of the states of the region and the world.
Second: In light of threats to energy security and maritime security in general, the Gulf states have succeeded in establishing numerous mechanisms to confront these threats, whether at the level of the Gulf Cooperation Council or at the regional level, through their presence in the Horn of Africa region, the establishment of regional mechanisms to preserve regional and maritime security, as well as through enhancing cooperation and partnerships with major states and defense organizations.
Third: Despite the importance of the efforts undertaken by the Gulf states to protect maritime security, there remains a need to activate several proposals, including the importance of employing military technology within efforts to confront maritime security threats, developing naval forces through acquiring advanced maritime equipment suited to the nature of current maritime threats, in addition to activating maritime cooperation with all major Arab powers, as well as major states and organizations concerned with the security of the Arabian Gulf.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: With the intensification of regional conflicts and the persistence of crises, maritime security for the Gulf states in general, and energy security in particular, are increasingly affected. Oil facilities and strategic oil transportation routes continue to be targets for armed terrorist groups and the states sponsoring them, which has sounded alarm bells regarding the necessity of establishing collective mechanisms to protect energy security in the Arabian Gulf. The region no longer faces only traditional threats such as piracy and smuggling operations, but also threats targeting energy itself, the backbone of the economies of the states of the region and the world.
Second: In light of threats to energy security and maritime security in general, the Gulf states have succeeded in establishing numerous mechanisms to confront these threats, whether at the level of the Gulf Cooperation Council or at the regional level, through their presence in the Horn of Africa region, the establishment of regional mechanisms to preserve regional and maritime security, as well as through enhancing cooperation and partnerships with major states and defense organizations.
Third: Despite the importance of the efforts undertaken by the Gulf states to protect maritime security, there remains a need to activate several proposals, including the importance of employing military technology within efforts to confront maritime security threats, developing naval forces through acquiring advanced maritime equipment suited to the nature of current maritime threats, in addition to activating maritime cooperation with all major Arab powers, as well as major states and organizations concerned with the security of the Arabian Gulf.
NATO and Maritime Security in the Arabian Gulf
This study analyzes the experience of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of maintaining maritime security, based on the capabilities available to the alliance on the one hand, and the expertise that the alliance possesses in this field on the other. The study aims to shed light on the position of maritime security within the alliance’s military doctrine in general through an analysis of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, issued by the alliance in 2011. It then addresses the alliance’s mechanisms for maintaining maritime security in the Middle East, and particularly off the coast of Somalia, through Operation Ocean Shield, which the alliance has conducted from 2008 until the present, while also highlighting the extent to which the alliance may contribute to protecting maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: NATO possesses extensive capabilities and expertise regarding maritime security operations, qualifying it to be a strategic partner in ensuring maritime security in different regions of the world.
Second: The alliance does not operate independently, as its officials believe that the best mechanism is to work within broader international coalitions. This requires the existence of United Nations resolutions that represent the fundamental basis for the alliance’s work, in addition to the importance of consensus within the alliance itself.
Third: In light of the challenges facing maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region, and the establishment of certain mechanisms to confront them, the fundamental basis for the success of these mechanisms lies in supporting the capabilities of the Gulf states.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: NATO possesses extensive capabilities and expertise regarding maritime security operations, qualifying it to be a strategic partner in ensuring maritime security in different regions of the world.
Second: The alliance does not operate independently, as its officials believe that the best mechanism is to work within broader international coalitions. This requires the existence of United Nations resolutions that represent the fundamental basis for the alliance’s work, in addition to the importance of consensus within the alliance itself.
Third: In light of the challenges facing maritime security in the Arabian Gulf region, and the establishment of certain mechanisms to confront them, the fundamental basis for the success of these mechanisms lies in supporting the capabilities of the Gulf states.
The Economic Impacts of Maritime Security Threats in the Arabian Gulf
This paper addresses the economic repercussions resulting from maritime security threats facing the Gulf states, which reached their peak in 2019 with the targeting of oil tankers off the coast of the United Arab Emirates and in the Gulf of Oman, in addition to the targeting of the oil facilities of Saudi Aramco in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in September 2019. This indicated that energy security had become exposed to a dual threat: “production areas and strategic transportation routes,” which necessitated the establishment of international mechanisms to preserve energy security. The paper begins by discussing general concepts framing the relationship between maritime security and the economy in general, then addresses the threats to maritime security facing the Gulf states, whether before 2019 or during that year, leading to an examination of the economic impacts of threats to maritime security.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: It is extremely difficult to establish indicators to measure the impact of security events on economic conditions with great precision, due to the complexity and multiplicity of economic aspects on the one hand, and the confidentiality of security-related information and data on the other. This practice is followed in all countries of the world. However, this does not negate the possibility of examining these effects through identifying specific sectors.
Second: Despite the escalation in the pace of maritime security threats during 2019, according to some key indicators, there were no major impacts resulting from those threats, due to changes in oil prices on the one hand, and the prevailing expectations that no direct military confrontation would erupt between the United States and Iran on the other hand.
Third: Maritime security threats — despite the limited nature of their impact — represent a challenge to the security of the Gulf states, which must take further measures to confront them, whether through continuing policies of diversifying sources of income away from oil, enhancing maritime capabilities, or strengthening and diversifying the Gulf states’ international partnerships.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: It is extremely difficult to establish indicators to measure the impact of security events on economic conditions with great precision, due to the complexity and multiplicity of economic aspects on the one hand, and the confidentiality of security-related information and data on the other. This practice is followed in all countries of the world. However, this does not negate the possibility of examining these effects through identifying specific sectors.
Second: Despite the escalation in the pace of maritime security threats during 2019, according to some key indicators, there were no major impacts resulting from those threats, due to changes in oil prices on the one hand, and the prevailing expectations that no direct military confrontation would erupt between the United States and Iran on the other hand.
Third: Maritime security threats — despite the limited nature of their impact — represent a challenge to the security of the Gulf states, which must take further measures to confront them, whether through continuing policies of diversifying sources of income away from oil, enhancing maritime capabilities, or strengthening and diversifying the Gulf states’ international partnerships.
The Experience of the Sultanate of Oman in Diversifying Sources of Income: Lessons Learned
The issue of fluctuating oil prices is considered one of the greatest challenges facing the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, as it directly affects all aspects of life in the state, beginning with deficits in the general budget, the contraction of financial and monetary resources, and limited investment in infrastructure projects and public services, and extending to declines in income levels and consumption rates, and consequently lower rates of economic growth.
Although economic studies confirmed the negative effects experienced by the Gulf economies as a result of the significant decline in oil prices at the beginning of the 1980s, the Gulf states did not seriously seek to change their economic structures except following the sharp decline in oil prices by approximately 70% in mid-2014.
The states that were less productive and less export-oriented in oil were the most eager to diversify their sources of income through a number of mechanisms and policies that help support the contribution of the private sector and increase the contributions of non-oil sectors to the gross domestic product. In this context, this study aims to present and analyze the experience of the Sultanate of Oman in diversifying sources of income, and the lessons learned from it for other Gulf states, through the following elements:
First: The nature of the rentier economy and its vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices.
Second: Diversification of sources of income, mechanisms and methods of implementation.
Third: The Omani experience in diversifying sources of income and the lessons learned.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: The Sultanate’s interest in investing in non-oil economic sectors, such as manufacturing industries, tourism, and logistics, contributes to the rapid growth of these sectors and brings about a structural transformation in the economy, making them qualified to become the primary source of national income and the driver of the economic and social development process.
Second: The study confirmed the Sultanate’s awareness that promising economic sectors cannot be developed without improving the business environment and developing legislative and legal frameworks that help the private sector and foreign direct investment play a greater role in the process of economic diversification.
Third: The Sultanate and the other Gulf states must accelerate the process of economic diversification during periods of prosperity, when abundant oil revenues can be reinvested in developing non-oil sectors. Furthermore, the process of structural transformation of the economy must take place through building a strong industrial base and productive sectors characterized by efficiency and competitiveness, which become the primary source of national income.
Although economic studies confirmed the negative effects experienced by the Gulf economies as a result of the significant decline in oil prices at the beginning of the 1980s, the Gulf states did not seriously seek to change their economic structures except following the sharp decline in oil prices by approximately 70% in mid-2014.
The states that were less productive and less export-oriented in oil were the most eager to diversify their sources of income through a number of mechanisms and policies that help support the contribution of the private sector and increase the contributions of non-oil sectors to the gross domestic product. In this context, this study aims to present and analyze the experience of the Sultanate of Oman in diversifying sources of income, and the lessons learned from it for other Gulf states, through the following elements:
First: The nature of the rentier economy and its vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices.
Second: Diversification of sources of income, mechanisms and methods of implementation.
Third: The Omani experience in diversifying sources of income and the lessons learned.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: The Sultanate’s interest in investing in non-oil economic sectors, such as manufacturing industries, tourism, and logistics, contributes to the rapid growth of these sectors and brings about a structural transformation in the economy, making them qualified to become the primary source of national income and the driver of the economic and social development process.
Second: The study confirmed the Sultanate’s awareness that promising economic sectors cannot be developed without improving the business environment and developing legislative and legal frameworks that help the private sector and foreign direct investment play a greater role in the process of economic diversification.
Third: The Sultanate and the other Gulf states must accelerate the process of economic diversification during periods of prosperity, when abundant oil revenues can be reinvested in developing non-oil sectors. Furthermore, the process of structural transformation of the economy must take place through building a strong industrial base and productive sectors characterized by efficiency and competitiveness, which become the primary source of national income.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Threat to Regional Security
This study analyzes the destabilizing role played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, one of the Iranian security institutions established decades ago with the objective of protecting the political system following the Iranian Revolution, and which is directly supervised by the Supreme Leader. There are even constitutional provisions upon which the establishment of this institution is based. The Supreme Leader entrusted this institution with the task of protecting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. This institution relies primarily on its management of economic institutions in Iran that operate beyond the scope of oversight and accountability, allowing it to utilize Iranian funds and resources to implement Iran’s regional project, which aims to achieve Iranian hegemony over the security of the Arabian Gulf region. However, regional and international developments — while enabling this institution to expand beyond Iran’s borders — have also created significant challenges to its operations, making its future role a matter of considerable debate, especially following the killing of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard, in a U.S. airstrike near Baghdad Airport on January 3, 2020.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: The study confirmed, through figures and sources, the extent of the destabilizing role played by the Revolutionary Guard in the current regional crises, in addition to its recruitment of numerous sleeper cells targeting the security of the Gulf states. This means that confronting this role would undermine Iran’s regional project, through which it essentially sought to become the “policeman of the Gulf” across extended historical periods from 1979 until the present.
Second: Despite the Revolutionary Guard’s reliance on constitutional and economic foundations, as well as political influence within Iran, which enabled it to become Iran’s regional instrument amid a turbulent regional environment that allowed Iran to expand within those crises, this does not necessarily mean that this role will continue indefinitely. Internal pressures and a regional environment that has become more complex, especially after the killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, as well as the emergence of an international climate unfavorable to Iran’s regional policies, mean that the continuation of this role at the same pace has become a matter of debate.
Third: Despite the international and regional efforts that recognized the extent of the danger posed by this military institution to vital interests in the region, especially maritime navigation security, and consequently designated this institution as a terrorist organization and imposed economic sanctions on its members and some of its affiliated economic entities, there remains a need for international consensus to tighten control over the financing of this institution, as well as its regional proxies, which represent a clear example of asymmetric warfare — currently considered the greatest threat facing global regional security.
The study concluded with three main findings:
First: The study confirmed, through figures and sources, the extent of the destabilizing role played by the Revolutionary Guard in the current regional crises, in addition to its recruitment of numerous sleeper cells targeting the security of the Gulf states. This means that confronting this role would undermine Iran’s regional project, through which it essentially sought to become the “policeman of the Gulf” across extended historical periods from 1979 until the present.
Second: Despite the Revolutionary Guard’s reliance on constitutional and economic foundations, as well as political influence within Iran, which enabled it to become Iran’s regional instrument amid a turbulent regional environment that allowed Iran to expand within those crises, this does not necessarily mean that this role will continue indefinitely. Internal pressures and a regional environment that has become more complex, especially after the killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, as well as the emergence of an international climate unfavorable to Iran’s regional policies, mean that the continuation of this role at the same pace has become a matter of debate.
Third: Despite the international and regional efforts that recognized the extent of the danger posed by this military institution to vital interests in the region, especially maritime navigation security, and consequently designated this institution as a terrorist organization and imposed economic sanctions on its members and some of its affiliated economic entities, there remains a need for international consensus to tighten control over the financing of this institution, as well as its regional proxies, which represent a clear example of asymmetric warfare — currently considered the greatest threat facing global regional security.
The Saudi Initiative for the Security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
This study addresses an issue that has long been — and continues to be — the subject of considerable controversy and debate, namely the security of the Red Sea. Despite the fact that most of the coastlines of this sea belong to Arab states, and despite the security challenges facing this region, it has not witnessed a regional security framework. Accordingly, the announcement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the signing of the founding charter establishing the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on January 6, 2020, constitutes an extremely important development, not only in terms of confronting maritime security threats in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the challenge this represents to both regional and global security alike, but also on the basis that this council represents an important mechanism for regional security in light of the current state of regional instability on the one hand, and the intensifying regional and international competition near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the other hand.
The paper concluded with three main findings:
First: At a time when the strategic importance of maritime waterways is increasing, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, threats to navigation through this strait are also increasing simultaneously, which has created regional and international competition near this vital passage. This has been reflected in the spread of numerous military bases in the Horn of Africa region.
Second: Despite the importance of the capabilities possessed by the states of the aforementioned council, which represent foundations upon which further developments can be built, the establishment of this new regional entity would enhance the economic, security, and even military capabilities of its member states, should an agreement be reached to establish a joint military force for these states. This requires the integration of visions, the setting of priorities for joint action, and the utilization of the comparative advantages of each state.
Third: This entity can benefit from other regional security experiences, which are numerous, including ASEAN and the European Union as sub-regional groupings, especially in terms of the founding charter, mechanisms of operation, methods of development, voting systems, and other issues, particularly since these groupings have undergone developments through different stages until reaching their current status. It is true that the identity of such groupings remains a product of their regional environment; however, these groupings contain many lessons that can be learned from.
The paper concluded with three main findings:
First: At a time when the strategic importance of maritime waterways is increasing, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, threats to navigation through this strait are also increasing simultaneously, which has created regional and international competition near this vital passage. This has been reflected in the spread of numerous military bases in the Horn of Africa region.
Second: Despite the importance of the capabilities possessed by the states of the aforementioned council, which represent foundations upon which further developments can be built, the establishment of this new regional entity would enhance the economic, security, and even military capabilities of its member states, should an agreement be reached to establish a joint military force for these states. This requires the integration of visions, the setting of priorities for joint action, and the utilization of the comparative advantages of each state.
Third: This entity can benefit from other regional security experiences, which are numerous, including ASEAN and the European Union as sub-regional groupings, especially in terms of the founding charter, mechanisms of operation, methods of development, voting systems, and other issues, particularly since these groupings have undergone developments through different stages until reaching their current status. It is true that the identity of such groupings remains a product of their regional environment; however, these groupings contain many lessons that can be learned from.
